Ultrawideband (UWB) transmitters will soon be integrated into a wide variety of portable electronic devices (PEDs) that passengers routinely cany on board commercial airplanes. The aeronautical community is concemed as to whether evolving FCC UWB rules are adequate to protect legacy and emerging aeronautical radio systems from electromagnetic interference (EMI) from emerging UWB products. The approach of this study was to introduce specific UWB-type EM1 signals to radio systems installed on airplanes, and to observe effects in' the same context that they would appear to flight crews, in a realistic operational signal environment. Because all UWB threat signals were calibrated referenced to FCC 15.209 limits for unlicensed transmitters, this paper presents an overview of the most extensive PED EM1 direct effects testing ever performed on commercial airplanes. Extensive details regarding this work are reported in a NASA Technical Publication.
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Radiated Emission Limits for UWB PEDs
On May 16,2002, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) published in the Federal Register a Final Rule, permitting marketing and operation of new products incorporating UWB technology.
[l] The FCC rulemaking process for introducing UWB technology bas been highly contentious, particularly where UWB systems have been designated to coexist in spectrum that is already allocated to safety-critical, military, or licensed radio frequency bands. Numerous U. S. government organizations, companies and universities have invested considerable resources in working with the FCC to develop emission limits and guidelines for the introduction of UWB technology into consumer wireless products. The FCC Final Rule defines new technical requirements for various UWB radio device applications, including "low, medium and high-frequency imaging" systems, "vehicular radar" systems, "indoor" UWB systems, and "handheld" UWB systems. Each UWB application type must meet different requirements for radiated emission limits. The requirements for "handheld" UWB systems, as addressed in FCC Final Rule Part 15.519, are ofprimary concem when considering UWB technology applications that may be incorporated into PEDs. This is because handheld UWB systems are specified by FCC rules to include laptop computers and portable digital assistants (PDAs), and belong to the class of communications and measurement systems that are not restricted to law enforcement, fire and emergency rescue, or specific industrial applications and do not require coordination with the FCC to operate them. Thus, it is likely that passengers will cany handheld-type UWB products on board commercial airplanes. The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) is actively working on a new standard for high data rate personal area networks, IEEE 802.15.3. [2] The IEEE standard will be the basis of the "Wimedia" and "Wireless U S B industry standards for inter-compatible, UWB-based products that will be regulated under FCC Part 15.519 rules. [3] Below 960 MHz, handheld There is currently an RTCA Special
Statement of the Problem
UWB devices may pose a new type of problem to aeronautical radio systems that could present a major hazard and significantly decrease safety margins. Existing aeronautical radio systems are not designed to coexist with on-channel EMI. Any level of increased on-channel EM1 will impair the performance of existing aeronautical radio systems, potentially degrading their availability and accuracy. While handheld UWB products are currently designated to operate in the 3.1 to 10.6 GHz radio frequency band, it is considered likely that some product implementations will also have UWB-like radiated emissions at frequencies below 3.1 GHz, at or near applicable FCC limits.
Because repeatable and verifiable occurrences of PED EMI to aircraft COM/NAV systems have been very rare, the aviation RF spectrum community is particularly concemed that the FCC and UWB product manufacturers may view FCC 15.209 limits as a valid constraint to UWB spurious emission levels. However, NASA tests that have clearly shown that spurious emissions from typical PEDS are far below FCC 15.209 limits, and maximum PED emissions are highly unlikely to coincide with the particular aviation radio channels being used at a given time. [8, 9] The introduction of PEDS that radiate signals at levels near FCC 15.209 limits, over broad bandwidths, would be significantly more detrimental to aeronautical radio systems. The FCC has indicated the intent to increase existing UWB spurious radiated emission limits, which would exacerbate EM1 concems for aeronautical radio systems.
As reported on subsequent pages, radiated emissions at FCC 15.209 limits can cause harmful interference to critical aircraft communication and navigation systems under certain conditions. If UWB emissions are of sufficient amplitude and appropriate PRF, multiple COM/NAV receiving systems on one aircraft could be affected simultaneously. Normal operational redundancy and backup required by the FAA for certification may not protect against such situations. Given the precedent of unauthorized mobile phone use during commercial airplane flights [lo, 11, 12, 131, it is inevitable that passengers will also operate handheld UWB transmitters on airplanes.
UWB Field Test on Operational
Airplanes on four different airplane types were evaluated, including large transport (Boeing 747, Airbus 3 19/320) and regional (Canadair Regional Jet and Embraer Brazilia 120) airplanes. These airplanes were selected on the basis of their representation of various airplane sizes, availability to the test team, and likelihood of having mini" coupling loss between particular passenger cabin locations and aircraft radio antennas. Table 1 summarizes the aeronautical radio systems that were evaluated.
analysis may be found in [I41

Multiple communication and navigation radios
A more detailed description of all testing and Aircraft Test Setups Figure 2 shows a diagram of a typical setup for UWB direct effects EM1 testing on an aitplane. To conserve fuel and minimize noise and other personnel safety hazards, it was preferable to provide airplane electrical system power from ground servicing equipment rather than onboard auxiliary power units (APUs). APUs were most often used on the smaller, regional airplanes. It was also necessary to provide 12OVAC 60 Hz power to the UWB source, spectrum analyzer, instrument control computer and other instrumentation. This 120 VAC electronic equipment was usually located inside the aircraft to provide weather protection and to facilitate communication between the UWB source operator, pilot and other test team members. To prevent electrostatic discharge and voltage fluctuations from interfering with test equipment and causing personnel safety hazards, it was very important to connect the aircraft structure to both earth ground and to the onboard test equipment ground terminals. To best approximate the electromagnetic boundary conditions of the aircraft in flight, extension cords and RF cabling were routed fiom the passenger cabin through an aircraft door or window as far as possible from the particular aircraft system antenna being tested. When reference signals were generated by ramp test sets, the signals were usually radiated 60m an antenna placed a few meters 60m the subject aircraft antenna.
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Aeronautical Reference Signals Because United and Sky West Airlines maintenance depot operations are in close proximity to VORDME and ILS beacons, ATC and TCAS transponders, and the air traffic control tower, most "live sky" aeronautical radio signals greatly exceeded the minimum necessary for acceptable aircraft receiver performance. This could have been a problem for EM1 direct effect testing, because a strong ambient reference signal may mask the effect of a weaker interfering signal that would have otherwise caused problems if the airplane were farther from the airport. A variety of "Ramp Test Sets" were employed to provide calibrated reference signals to each aircraft radio system, in order to verify their performance when installed on an airplane. For UWB EM1 testing, the ramp test sets were operated at a fixed location inside or outside the aircraft, as attenuation was added until the received signal at the aircraft was at the minimum level required for reliable lock-on to the reference signal, then 3dB of attenuation was removed in order to achieve a solid signal lock.
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Figure 2. Typical Setup for U W B EM1 Effects Testing on Aircraft Radio Receiver Systems UWB EM1 testing was performed while the radio link relationship between the airplane and portable Ramp Test Set was undisturbed. Most testing was performed at night, with aircraft located outdoors and away from other work activity so as to minimize affecting the RF link between the aircraft radios and ramp test sets.
attempting to provide reference test signals to the GPS and SATCOM aeronautical receiver systems. First, the spectrum management approval and air traffic control issues associated with radiating artificial GPS and SATCOM signals pose an air traffic safety concem when compared to radiating test signals for aircraft beacons, transponders or VHF Com systems. Second, the GPS and SATCOM systems are designed to operate in a manner that constantly adapts to the existing satellite coverage situation. GPS integrates data from a continuously variable combination of satellites, whereas SATCOM follows an interactive protocol in establishing a radio link on one of many available radio channels. Test equipment for realistically simulating GPS and SATCOM radio links with an aircraft was considered prohibitively difficult. Fortunately, GPS and SATCOM provide There are a number of difficulties in relatively consistent signal strength to any U.S. location, particularly when compared to beacons, transponders or VHF Com aeronautical radio systems. For these reasons, GPS and SATCOM were tested using the ambient signals available from the satellite constellation at the time of test. The date, time and weather conditions during each test were recorded to aid in subsequent analysis.
UWB Interfering Signals
The UWB source output was characterized in NASA LaRC laboratories according to FCC 15.209 and 15.519 measurement processes. Tables were developed to readily provide the UWB source attenuation required so that UWB signals from the test antenna were exactly compliant with the maximum FCC-allowable limits. The UWB source output was routed through a precision dial attenuator, allowing 1 dB resolution and up to 99dB of attenuation before being transmitted through the antenna. A photograph of the UWB source equipment on board an airplane is shown in Figure 3 (left). The UWB transmit antenna was placed 1 meter from the aircraft antenna for UTM comparison measurements (Figure 3, right, top) , and then moved inside the aircraft to simulate the passenger use of a UWB transmitter (Figure 3, 
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right, bottom). Because most aircraft ratio systems incorporate identically redundant receiver and antenna systems, 1-meter EM1 effects testing was usually performed on the most easily accessible antenna system, whereas the passenger cabin EM1 effects testing was usually performed from preselected locations inside the airplane. 
EM1 Criteria Definition
The following general criteria were used to assess EM1 effects to aeronautical receiver systems. These criteria are more specifically defined for each system in [15] .
evidence that EM1 is affecting aircraft system behavior. These effects may or may not be evident to the flight crew (and in some cases may only be observable using ground test equipment). Observable effects do not necessarily constitute an operational or system failure.
Operational EM1 Failures: EMI-induced impairment or failure that prevents the system from performing its intended function in the presence of a hown good source signal. The function of the system is defined by the standards criteria for which the system was developed. These standards include Observable EM1 Effects: Detectable
Test Results Summary for Aircraft Systems Operating Below 960MHz
Operational failure could be induced on all four aeronautical radio systems evaluated, when transmitting UWB signals at or below FCC 15.209 limit levels from locations inside one or more of the airplanes tested. VHF COM could be disrupted throughout the passenger cabin of every airplane type at UWB signal levels below FCC 15.209 limits. FCC 15.209 limits apply to spurious emissions radiated from handheld UWB systems below 960MHz. Figure 4 shows the minimum UWB signal levels required to induce operational failure for each airplane type, as compared to the FCC 15.209 limits. indicate the potential for FCC-compliant devices to cause operational failure to aeronautical radio systems, when operated inside the airplane
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passenger cabin. If UWB spurious radiated emission limits were raised to the FCC 15.209 limits, interference margins would be significantly reduced. It is important to note that the levels shown in Figure 5 & 6 are operational failure levels. For GPS, operational failure was defined as the loss of a single satellite. However, on Airplane #3, decreased CMo was shown to occur at UWB EM1 levels 50 to 60 dB below the point at which system experienced a loss of a satellite lock. As the UWB signal level was increased, each GPS receiver increasingly lost lock of some satellites until an insufficient number were left to support the operational mode. At that point, operational failure and system failure occurred suddenly. To assess the safety impact of GPS system failure or impairment due to EMI, it is necessary to consider the criticality of GPS data integrity as applicable to particular flight operations. It is not known whether this small level of system impairment could be of any consequence to the performance requirements for various GPS applications. It would not be appropriate to increase allowable UWB limits on the basis of this data. Failure Onset Times and First-Effects Levels operational failure. This was because the "ATC Fail" annunciation by aircraft caution and warning systems was highly dependent upon whether the system was in Ground or Air mode, and occurred at UWB interference levels much higher than required for operational failure. System failure (activation of the ATC Fail light) typically occurred at UWB levels 20 dB (Ground Mode) to 65 dB (Air Mode) higher than required for Operational Failure (90% or less replies). The ATC Fail Light was about 40 to 45 dB more sensitive to EMI in Ground mode than in Air mode. On some airplanes ATC system failure would cause all displayed TCAS airplanes to disappear. In some cases, the displayed TCAS aitplane range was observed to vary by a small percentage before operational failure (loss of displayed TCAS airplane) occurred.
For GPS, the parameters for monitoring GPS signal health are not consistently defined among equipment manufacturers or readily observable on many airplanes. EM1 effects may or may not be evident to the flight crew, depending upon the phase of flight and system interdependencies. In order to consistently compare data between different airplanes, the "first observable effect" criteria was taken to be the UWB power level causing loss of a single satellite. However, on one airplane, C/No was displayed for each individual satellite, revealing decreased CMo at UWB EM1 levels 50 to 60 dF3 below the point at which system experienced a loss of satellite lock. As the UWB signal level was increased, each GPS receiver increasingly lost lock of some satellites until an insufficient number were left to support the operational mode. At that point, operational failure and system failure occurred suddenly. This generally occurred within a IdB signal level change. Recovery from failure took from 3 to 21 seconds after UWB was tumed off.
For SATCOM, failure onset time was instantaneous. BER degradation was shown to occur with UWB power levels about 4 to 10 dF3 below those required for operational failure. EM1 effects would not likely be evident to the crew, For ATC, a ramp test set was required to detect
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unless they are actively attempting to use the system. The loss of lockheacquisition process would automatically take about 15 seconds, once the interfering source was removed.
UWB PRF and Modulation Effects susceptible to any particular UWB PRF. ATC tended to be more sensitive (failure at lower UWB levels) to a lower U W B PRF than the other systems tested. GPS tended to be more sensitive to higher UWB PRFs.
Modulation did influence the UWB signal levels required to cause operational failure, but this effect was not consistent among system or airplane types. It is important to note that the limited frequency stability of the intemal clock reference in the U W B source became an increasingly significant factor at higher frequencies. This shortcoming would manifest itself in the frequency domain as a random spreading of spectral lines, similar to random dithering, even with no UWB modulation applied. This deficiency likely causes an underestimation of the impact of modulation to UWB EM1 susceptibility for aeronautical radios tested above 1 GHz. DME and TCAS failure levels were not 
Conclusions
